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This Article argues that over the past years, in Europe, some in-
struments and policies dealing with gender equality both at the 
national and supra-national level reflect a move from a narrow an-
tidiscrimination frame to a broader model that tackles the under-
participation and disempowerment of women in public and private 
life as a deficiency of democracy and a problem of citizenship. By ana-
lyzing specific parity measures that have been adopted recently in 
some European Member States, such as electoral and corporate board 
gender quotas in publically held companies, the Article posits that a 
new understanding between parity democracy, sex equality and an-
tidiscrimination law is evolving and explains why a combination of 
legal, historical, cultural, ideological and political factors make it un-
likely that a similar development will take place in the United States. 
Gender inequalities in the United States and Europe are persist-
ing. Only 59% of women in the United States are in the labor force. 
Women in the United States continue to earn less money than men 
for equal work, shoulder more childcare and household responsibili-
ties and are more likely to live in poverty. Women are said to hold 
only 15% of chair seats in Fortune 500 companies, chairing only 2% of 
the boards. The figures of women in public office are particularly 
striking, with women representing only 16.80% in Congress and 17% 
in the Senate after the November 2010 elections.1 In spite of this, 
gender quotas in politics or in business are not a popular concept. 
In Europe as well women continue to hold an unequal position in 
the employment domain. According to the European Union's (EU) lat-
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est Report on Progress on Equality between Women and Men,2 as of 
2009, the employment rate of women was only 62.5%. In Europe, 
31.4% of the women and 8.1% of the men worked part-time. Signifi-
cantly, the countries where nearly 75% of women were working 
(Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) had among the highest 
part-time rates. Whereas the labor market participation of mothers 
was 11.5 points lower than that of women without children, the rate 
for fathers was 8.5 points higher than that for men without children. 
Women across the European Union still earned 17.5% less on average 
than men. Several explanations, besides discrimination, are now 
commonly provided. They include persisting gender stereotypes, seg-
regation in the employment market, and the unbalanced sharing of 
care responsibilities with men. It is increasingly argued that changes 
are unlikely unless women become more empowered both in the pub-
lic and private sphere, meaning in politics and in businesses. As of 
2010 the average number of female members of national parliaments 
(single/lower houses) was still 24% and among senior ministers of na-
tional governments, the share of women amounted to only 27%. 
Moreover, only 3% of the largest publicly quoted companies had a wo-
man chairing the highest decision-making body. 
Nevertheless, as opposed to the United States, over the last two 
decades the unequal distribution of roles, tasks and power between 
women and men has become a key issue in European democracies 
resulting in new approaches, including different types of gender quo-
tas, to advance gender equality and to reconceptualize citizenship 
rights. This Article argues that Europe is slowly departing from a 
narrowly conceived equal rights/opportunities (i.e., formal/substan-
tive) sex equality framework in order to gradually embrace what I 
identify as a parity democracy equality model.3 As we shall see, this 
model expands the target from the recognition of equal rights and 
opportunities (mostly in the employment domain) to enabling both 
men and women to participate equally in all domains of citizenship. 
Crucially, it reclaims and re-evaluates the domain of social reproduc-
tion as a domain of citizenship, and also brings to the fore the 
interrelationship between sex-differentiated degrees of participation 
in each of the relevant manifestations of citizenship, i.e., care and 
social reproduction, politics and the market. 
2. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON PROGRESS ON EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN 
AND MEN IN 2010. THE GENDER BALANCE IN BUSINESS LEADERSHIP (2011) [hereinafter 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION]. 
3. On the insufficiency of both formal and substantive equality to account for 
gender quotas seeking to overcome women's political underrepresentation and the 
need to understand them as rather embodying a specific democratic conception fight-
ing the legacy of the separate spheres tradition, see Blanca Rodriguez Ruiz & Ruth 
Rubio-Marin, Constitutional Justification of Parity Democracy, 60 ALABAMA L. REV. 
1167 (2009). 
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The Article starts with some reflections on the theoretical under-
pinnings of the proposed parity democracy sex equality model (I). It 
then shows that this is at least the direction in which equality be-
tween men and women has been heading in Europe by describing the 
framing of sex equality in (mostly non-binding) instruments and poli-
cies of the EU and the European Council, which seek to empower 
women by including them in traditionally male domains of power 
(both public and private) (II). It also examines specific parity mea-
sures that have been statutorily enacted in some European Member 
States including gender quotas to ensure the balanced participation 
of women in political bodies and on corporate boards (III). The Article 
explains how best to understand the connection between parity de-
mocracy, sex equality, and antidiscrimination law (IV). It finally 
introduces some hypotheses about the possibilities and difficulties to 
transplant a parity democracy sex equality model to the United 
States (V) before proffering a final thought (VI). 
I. PARITY DEMOCRACY: A PROPOSED CONCEPTION OF SEX EQUALITY 
The sex equality parity democracy model takes us back to the 
origins of the state and representative democracy and to the ideology 
of the social contract and of the sexual contract on which it rests.4 It 
is this social-sexual contract that enshrined the separate spheres tra-
dition in industrial societies, by drawing the modern boundary 
between the public and the private domain as respectively masculine 
and feminine (both symbolically and functionally) while at the same 
time inheriting pre-industrial patriarchy and its system of subordina-
tion of women to men in the family domain. Thus, the gendered 
identification of the public and private areas was a structural feature 
of the modern state that disqualified women as active citizens, deny-
ing them the possibility to inhabit the so-defined public sphere.5 
Central to the construction of the separate spheres and of the 
definition of citizenship around the male public sphere was the pre-
eminence given to the notion of independence as a synonym of free-
dom in the new liberal regimes. Modernity enshrined the liberal view 
of the subject of rights as an autonomous being, master of his own life 
project. Whereas being a property owner was initially seen as the key 
signifier of independence (something which for years justified limit-
ing the franchise to men of certain social positions), with the rise of 
industrial capitalism economic independence came to encompass the 
ideal of earning a family wage, so that property ownership, wage la-
bor and self-employment all came to be recognized as forms of 
4. See CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988). 
5. See Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, Civil Citizenship Against Social Citizen-
ship, in THE CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP 88 (Bart van Steenbergen ed., 1994). 
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article-abstract/60/1/99/2571363
by UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA user
on 03 July 2018
102 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 6 0 
economic independence.6 As a result, both participation in politics 
and in the market through employment were acknowledged as re-
spectable domains of citizenship. 
This understanding of freedom pathologized dependency and 
those who, by definition, were branded as "dependent."7 Indeed, de-
pendency or interdependency was not seen as a defining aspect of the 
person, but as an external enemy against which man, naturally free, 
must defend himself.8 But since independence was from the start 
merely a myth, the state could only assume the individual to be inde-
pendent by removing the manifestations of individual dependency as 
much as possible. And this was possible only to the extent that the 
individual, the paradigmatic citizen, was conceived as first, proper-
tied- male and then, employed or self-employed-male. Women instead 
were assigned the task of social reproduction, a task that lacked 
equal political and social significance. In naturally taking on the re-
sponsibility of care it was expected that women would enable men's 
physical, social, and cultural survival, silently allowing the ideal of 
men as independent citizens and actors in the public sphere to work 
in practice.9 Men thus achieved an appearance of independence by 
shifting toward women the weight of their own dependency.10 This is 
how women, by being "just women," enabled men to become citizens. 
As managers of their own and other people's (i.e., men's) depen-
dency, women were in turn constructed as dependent, as political 
minors and hence as unfit for active citizenship, the family becoming 
then a falsely 'depoliticized' sphere of male authority and female la-
bor. As a result, women's citizenship could only be constructed as 
indirect, a result of their relationship with men, and as passive, de-
pending on men and/or the State for maintenance and protection. 
Therefore, the extension of male suffrage regardless of property rec-
onciled the concept of employment and citizenship and rendered both 
dignified spheres of citizenship participation. By contrast, the exten-
sion of female suffrage and the granting of equal employment rights 
to women were insufficient to guarantee their equal citizenship sta-
tus, because they did not fundamentally alter the underlying sexual 
contract. In fact, women acquired social and political rights before 
they achieved equal private law rights, especially vis-a-vis their 
6. See Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of "Dependency": Tracing a 
Keyword of the US Welfare State, in JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON 
THE "POSTSOCIALIST" CONDITION 128 (1997). 
7. Id. at 126. 
8. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Ine-
quality Among Mankind (1755), reprinted in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST 
AND SECOND DISCOURSES 69 (Susan Dawn & Gita May eds., 2002). 
9. Rodriguez Ruiz & Rubio-Marin, supra note 3, at 1177. 
10. Id., at 109. 
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spouses and in the family domain.11 But even when formal equality 
of rights between the sexes was finally recognized in a comprehensive 
manner, the domain of human reproduction and care remained con-
ceptualized as "private" and culturally enshrined as "female," and the 
implications of this for women's ability to participate in the domain 
called public were simply denied. 
This is the situation that a parity democracy sex equality model 
seeks to address and rectify. Although in its common usage, the no-
tion of parity democracy has been usually linked to the project of 
empowering women by adopting mechanisms (such as gender quotas) 
to overcome women's traditional underrepresentation in democrati-
cally elected institutions or publicly appointed bodies, the model 
defended here has a broader and deeper aspiration. Its core objective 
is to unsettle the separate spheres tradition, understood as the tradi-
tion that separates the public from the private domain; defines them 
respectively as primarily male and female domains; recognizes only 
the public sphere as a domain of citizenship and power; devalues the 
social relevance of the activities and forms of participation that take 
place in the so-called private sphere while at the same time de-
politicizing the forms of male power and hierarchy that find 
expression within it. 
Unsettling the social construction of gender requires introducing 
human inter-dependency as a central feature of human life and rede-
fining the type of human autonomy that the liberal ideal tries to 
protect.12 The autonomy paradigm, the paradigmatic citizen, can no 
longer be the dependence-free individual, but rather the person who 
takes responsibility for his or her own dependence, as well as for 
those who depend upon him or her, as natural limitations but also as 
source of meaning of any life project. The paradigm of autonomy thus 
becomes, not independence, but interdependence, and (in-
ter)dependency and care become constituent components of 
citizenship.13 This makes the fundamental goal of parity democracy 
be about disestablishing a gendered notion of citizenship, a notion 
which thus far has passed as simply universal by banning social re-
production from the "public universe" and by imagining a "public" 
universe inhabited by perfectly independent citizens. 
11. THE CONQUEST OF FEMALE SUFFRAGE IN EUROPE (Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz & 
Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., forthcoming 2012). 
12. Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz & Ruth Rubio-Marin, The Gender of Representation: 
On Democracy, Equality and Parity, 6 ICON 287 (2008). 
13. See Joan Tronto, Care as the Work of Citizens. A Modest Proposal, in WOMEN 
AND CITIZENSHIP 131, 140 et seq. (Marilyn Friedman ed., 2003). 
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II. EUROPE'S NEW SEX EQUALITY MODEL: FROM EQUAL 
RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES TO EQUAL EMPOWERMENT AND 
BALANCED PARTICIPATION 
In 1965, the main concern underlying the only primary norm 
dealing with sex equality in the Treaty of Rome of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), namely Article 119 establishing the 
principle of "equal pay for equal work," was the reduction of unfair 
competition between Member States. It was the European Court of 
Justice which in a ruling of April 1976 explicitly recognized the prin-
ciple of sex equality in its double economic/social objective to be "a 
founding principle of the EEC," opening the way to spillovers beyond 
the workplace.14 From then on, we observe an evolution of the treat-
ment of equality between men and women from a limited, social, and 
mostly employment related issue (still at the core of the EU's con-
cerns), to a broader question of justice.15 This evolution has been 
reflected in the expansion of the legal framework of the EU's gender 
equality model enshrined in its primary norms, an evolution in which 
the Treaty of Amsterdam epitomized a moment of constitutional 
change. The Treaty of Amsterdam added new gender equality provi-
sions. Equality between men and women was incorporated in the 
Treaty as a fundamental community value to be promoted (Article 2). 
Inspired by the Beijing Women's Conference, the Treaty also incorpo-
rated the idea of gender mainstreaming (Article 3), setting thus the 
basis for policies in pursuit of gender equality, preventing the con-
finement to an equal opportunity ghetto and promoting integration 
across all fields of policy-making. The Treaty also enshrined the 
Council's EU competence to undertake pro-active measures to combat 
discrimination based on sex as well as racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation (Article 13). The princi-
ple of equal pay was re-crafted as a principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value and a new paragraph was added to the new Article 141, 
allowing Member States to adopt positive discrimination measures. 
Reaffirmed under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union still oper-
ates under this legal framework whose profile is now reproduced in 
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.16 
The extent to which such legal framework and policies have al-
lowed women to make progress has been questioned. The model's 
continued reliance on a formal understanding of equality which 
makes affirmative action measures an exception that the Court of 
14. Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne, 1976, C-43/75 
[ECR 455]. 
15. See Agnes Hubert, From Equal Pay to Parity Democracy: the Rocky Ride of 
Women's Policy in the European Union, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING 
EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 143, 148 (Jytte Klausen 
& Charles S. Maier eds., 2001). 
16. See arts. 20, 21, 23.1 and 23.2, respectively. 
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Justice defined narrowly, and the inherent limitations of an antidis-
crimination equality model to address structural inequalities, have 
both been criticized. At best, it has been claimed, the model has accel-
erated the process whereby some women have entered the male 
domain of employment, and even so, in a segregated market where 
the most precarious forms of employment (unwanted part-time, un-
derpaid, with poor employment conditions) are overwhelmingly 
feminized. Gender equality has broadened to incorporate news con-
cepts and new issues but true transformation in terms of gender 
equality has remained rather modest.17 
Still, when taking a look at the areas of policy concern and at the 
rhetoric endorsed at the EU and the Council of Europe level, we can 
clearly detect an expansion and deepening in the understanding of 
the meaning of sex equality since at least the mid 1980s. This was 
precisely the time when affirmative action, including quotas and 
binding commitments to counteract indirect discrimination in the la-
bor market, were being questioned. It was a time when a "need was 
felt to shift the debate from the quantitative claim underlying quotas 
and affirmative action to a qualitative necessity related to the nature 
of democracy."18 
Regarding the European Union, we can observe that whereas ini-
tially European policies were limited to non-discrimination and equal 
opportunities in the employment domain, gradually there has been 
an expansion of what equality between men and women means. The 
main gist seems to be that gender equality is a democratic necessity, 
encompassing women's empowerment both in the public and private 
domain as well as addressing the question of reconciliation of work 
and family life and, as a natural corollary, albeit more tentatively, 
that of the unfair distribution of family responsibilities. A similar 
concern with ensuring the balanced participation between women 
and men in political and public decision-making had become a prior-
ity in the European human rights context thanks to the actions 
undertaken by Council of Europe in the field of gender equality, and 
under the main responsibility of the Steering Committee for Equality 
between Women and Men. But whereas in the context of the Council 
of Europe, women's empowerment could be more squarely justified as 
a matter of human rights and democracy, given the EU's limited 
sphere of competences, its initiatives in this domain have typically 
been instrumentally linked to broader socio-economic objectives. In 
general, what we see is a wide display of arguments recalling that 
gender equality is a fundamental right as well as a vital objective to 
ensure the EU's growth, employment and social cohesion goals and at 
17. See Maria Stratigaki, The Cooptation of Gender Concepts in EU Policies: The 
Case of "Reconciliation of Work and Family," 11 SOCIAL POLITICS 30 (2004). 
18. Hubert, supra note 15, at 144. 
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the same time a necessary instrument for the strengthening of Euro-
pean democracies.19 
A brief look at the history of the initiatives and instruments of 
both the Council of Europe and the European Union shows that, 
whatever their ultimate justification, such initiatives and instru-
ments have all clearly and progressively reinforced each other and 
gradually come to reflect the parity democracy equality model. The 
First European Ministerial Conference on Equality between Women 
and Men held in Strasbourg in 1986 was devoted to Equality between 
women and men in political life-Policy and strategies to achieve equal-
ity in decision-making. It was followed in 1988 by a Declaration on 
equality between women and men, adopted by the Committee of Min-
isters stating that gender equality was an integral part of human 
rights and a prerequisite for genuine democracy. 
Soon after, the concern with the participation of women in deci-
sion-making was reflected for the first time in the Third European 
Commission's Pluriannual Action Program (1991-1995), under a new 
chapter on the "status of women in society."20 The actions taken to 
implement the Program marked the beginning of a process now rec-
ognized to have been decisive in most Member States, spawning an 
intensive follow-up process across Europe and culminating in a Rec-
ommendation by the Council in 1996.21 This Recommendation 
invited the Member States to adopt a comprehensive, integrated 
strategy to redress the under-representation of women in decision-
making bodies, including, where necessary, through the introduction 
of legislative and/or regulatory measures and incentives. 
At the level of the Council of Europe, the concept of parity democ-
racy was also becoming central. The Declaration on Equality between 
women and men as a fundamental criterion of democracy, adopted 
during the 4th European Ministerial Conference on Equality between 
Women and Men in Istanbul in 1997, became a key reference in that 
context. In fact, the Declaration stated that equality between men 
and women required a "dynamic challenge to the established power 
structures and to stereotyped sex roles so as to achieve structural 
change" and a "new social order." Part of this change required 
"greater participation by men in the sphere of private life and in car-
ing responsibilities" and a "more equal sharing of responsibilities for 
decision-making in political and professional life with women"—mea-
sures that would arguably "improve the quality of life for all." 
19. See, e.g., The Women's Charter adopted by the Commission in Mar. 2010 to 
commemorate the 15th anniversary of the Beijing Platform for Action (COM (2010) 78 
final, Communication from the Commission (Brussels, 5.3.2010)). 
20. See the "Third Medium-Term Community Action Program for Equal Opportu-
nities for Women and Men" (1991-1995). 
21. Council Recommendation on the balanced participation of women and men in 
decision-making 96/694/EC. 
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In the new century, the goal of balanced participation has re-
mained high on the European agenda. It has continued to be an 
objective pressed by the European Parliament22 and has remained a 
priority area in the Commission's Action Programmes on Equality be-
tween Men and Women, including the one most recently adopted for 
the 2010-2015 period.23 At the Council of Europe level it has been the 
focus of several additional resolutions and recommendations.24 A 
2009 Declaration by the Committee of Ministers (Making gender 
equality a reality) best captures the new equality model when it re-
fers to gender equality as a fundamental criterion of democracy 
specifying that, far from merely implying equal rights, it also re-
quires "equal visibility, empowerment, responsibility and 
participation of both women and men in all spheres of public and pri-
vate life." It urged Member States to address power imbalances and 
to take measures to guarantee "the equal sharing of responsibilities 
between women and men and to reconcile their private, family and 
professional lives." A major feature of the most recent policy docu-
ments has been an increasing emphasis on the gender balance in 
business leadership.25 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL BATTLES AROUND PARITY DEMOCRACY 
MEASURES: WOMEN'S QUOTAS FOR POLITICAL OFFICE AND 
CORPORATE BOARDS 
Whereas the previous section shows the profile of a new model of 
equality between men and women linked to a vision of parity democ-
racy being advanced by European supra-national entities mainly 
through soft-law instruments and systems of incentives, the compati-
bility of this model with constitutional principles is tested when 
Member States pass legislation making parity democracy measures 
mandatory. Only then does it becomes clear that the parity democ-
racy sex equality model has the potential to challenge deep-seeded 
and constitutionally enshrined principles, rights and structures of 
22. See European Parliament resolution on the Commission report on the imple-
mentation of Council Recommendation 96/694 of Dec. 2, 1996 on the balanced 
participation of women and men in the decision-making process (COM(2000) 120, C5-
0210/2000, 2000/2117(COS)). 
23. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, STRATEGY FOR EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 
(2010 - 2015) (2011). 
24. Worth mentioning are two recommendations of the Committee of Ministers: 
Recommendation Rec (2003) 3 on The Balanced Participation of Women and Men in 
Political and Public Decision-Making that defines balanced participation as a mini-
mum of 40% of both sexes in all decision-making bodies in political or public life and 
Recommendation Rec (2007) on Gender Equality Standards and Mechanisms. 
25. Indeed, the last REPORT ON THE PROGRESS ON EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND 
MEN adopted by the European Commission in 2010 (supra note 2) has chosen this as 
its main focus of attention and justifies the business case for the inclusion of women 
on considerations of justice as well as considerations about the overall social utility, in 
terms of micro- and macro-economic objectives. 
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government, including those that ensure non-discrimination on the 
grounds of sex, those that safeguard non-interference domains in the 
family, political parties and business, and those that shape the chan-
nels of democratic self-government. 
A. Gender Quotas and Political Office 
Over the last two decades, the idea of relying on some form of 
quota to ensure women's access to political office has been accepted in 
several European countries. In France, Belgium, Slovenia, Spain and 
Portugal, the law imposes some form of gender quota in electing rep-
resentatives for political office.26 In many other countries, such as 
Norway, Sweden, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom, some of 
the political parties have adopted gender quotas for electoral candi-
dates voluntarily. It is of course the use of legislatively imposed 
quotas challenging notions of formal equality, the autonomy of politi-
cal parties and dominant conceptions of representative democracy 
that has been most controversial. Not surprisingly, in several Euro-
pean countries including France, Italy and Spain, gender quota 
legislation has been constitutionally challenged and, in some in-
stances, these challenges have tr iggered consti tutional 
amendments.27 
An eloquent example of the idea that mandatory gender quotas 
are incompatible with both formal equality and representative de-
mocracy, is the 1982 decision of the French Conseil Constitutionnel 
striking down an act that obliged electoral ballots in municipal elec-
tions to have at least 25% of candidates of each gender.28 Faithful to 
the universalist notion of citizenship prevalent in France, the Conseil 
held that the principles of equality before the law, of national sover-
eignty, and the indivisibility of the electoral body, recognized in the 
French Constitution (Article 3) and in the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen of 1789 (Article 6), all preclude any person or 
group from claiming the exclusive exercise of national sovereignty. 
That they confer upon every citizen an equal right to vote and to 
stand for elections, without any qualifications or exceptions, other 
than those that may stem from such conditions as age or incapacity.29 
26. See European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy De-
partment C, Electoral Gender Quota Systems and Their Implementation in Europe 11 
(2008). 
27. See Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz & Ruth Rubio-Marfn, On Parity, Interdependence, 
and Women's Democracy, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM (Beverly Baines ed., 2011). 
28. See CC decision no. 82-146DC, Nov. 18, 1982, J.O. 3475. For a thorough dis-
cussion of the French debate, see Rodriguez-Ruiz & Rubio-Marfn, supra note 12, at 
287-93. 
29. Based on this 1982 decision, in 1999 the Conseil Constitutionnel also invali-
dated the law regulating elections to the Corsican Assembly, which would have 
introduced strict parity on electoral ballots. See CC decision no. 98-408 DC [J.O.], Jan. 
20, 1999, at 1028. 
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The Italian Constitutional Court reached a similar conclusion in 
199530 in the context of a constitutional challenge brought against 
two laws, regulating local, provincial and, to some extent, national 
elections, and stipulating gender quotas in electoral ballots.31 Al-
though Article 3.2 of the Italian Constitution sanctions substantive 
equality,32 the Court basically argued that it was not enough to sup-
port the adoption of affirmative action measures in the political field. 
Like in France, the way to electoral gender quotas in Italy and 
gender parity had to be opened through constitutional amendments, 
i.e., by inserting provisions to move from a formal towards a substan-
tive understanding of equality in the political domain.33 Such reform 
was not necessary in Spain. In January of 2008 the Constitutional 
Court held that the general principle of substantive equality, as en-
shrined in the Spanish Constitution, was sufficient to limit the 
autonomy of political parties; the Court thus upheld legislation mak-
ing it compulsory for electoral ballots to include not less than 40% of 
candidates of each sex. The Court rejected the arguments put forward 
by the plaintiffs, according to which such legislation contradicted the 
formal equality principle in relation to the right to participate in pub-
lic affairs, political parties' right to self-organization, free speech and 
ideological freedom, as well as the principle of the unitary sover-
eignty of the Spanish nation.34 
In sum, we see that electoral gender quotas and parity are inad-
missible under a formal understanding of the equality principle, 
while they may well be, and indeed often are, justified under a sub-
stantive equality model as a sort of affirmative action measure, at 
least until women can be said truly to enjoy equal opportunities to 
access representative positions. Still, in Italy, a general substantive 
equality provision was not considered a sufficient constitutional foun-
dation to sustain electoral quotas, requiring constitutional 
amendment, while in Spain the Court held exactly the opposite. In 
my view, this is due to the fact that even the substantive equality 
30. Corte cost., decision no. 422/1995. For a discussion of the Italian debate, see 
Rodriguez-Ruiz & Rubio-Marin, supra note 12, at 294 et seq. 
31. These are Law No. 81/1993 and Law No. 277/1993. 
32. Article 3.2, states that "it is the duty of the republic to remove all economic 
and social obstacles that, by limiting the freedom and equality of citizens, prevent full 
individual development and the participation of all workers in the political, economic, 
and social organization of the country." 
33. In France, a constitutional law added a fourth paragraph to Article 3 of the 
French Constitution, whereby "the law shall favour equality among women and men 
to have access to electoral mandates and hold elective office." See Law No. 99-569 of 
July 8, 1999 [J.O.], July 9, 1999, at 10175. As for Italy, Constitutional Law No. 2/ 
2001; Constitutional Law No. 3/2001 and Constitutional Law No. 1/2003 all intro-
duced reforms sanctioning the need to promote parity of access to elective office 
between men and women. 
34. See STC 12/2008, Jan. 29, 2008 upholding law Ley orgdnica para la igualdad 
efectiva entre mujeres y hombres (B.O.E. 2007, 71) (on the Effective Equality of Wo-
men and Men). 
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logic seeking women's equal opportunities in the political domain is 
insufficient to give a proper account of the aim of sex-balanced com-
position of politically representative bodies. Instead, it is the nature 
of democratic legitimacy that is being restated. Under a substantive 
equality logic, measures that enhance opportunities might be easier 
to justify than those that guarantee certain results. Similarly, tempo-
rary measures can be much better accounted for than parity 
measures that are open ended in time. Although the goal of enhanc-
ing opportunities may justify quotas that ensure a minimum 
representation threshold for women (25% to 30%), it is not clear why 
parity measures (i.e., quotas that apply to both sexes, and not only to 
women, and that set the threshold at 50% or something close to it, 
like those approved in both France and Spain) would pass a propor-
tionality test. Finally, embracing an affirmative action/substantive 
equality/equal opportunities logic to support gender quotas in elected 
offices is also at odds with the unitary representation model and the 
notion of electoral formal equality that it represents. 
In order to fully understand what has happened in countries 
where either gender parity or some form of gender quota has been 
established, one has to move beyond the rights discourse and address 
questions concerning the contours of our representative democracy, 
shedding light on the implications of a shift towards parity democ-
racy. The traditional representation model, i.e., the model of unitary 
general representation that came hand in hand with the liberal state 
inaugurated with the French Revolution, is antithetical to both par-
ity and any conceivable form of quotas that would defy the notion of a 
unitary electoral body, as well as with the prevalence of formal equal-
ity in the electoral field that is intrinsic to it. Also, gender quotas and/ 
or parity defy the traditional, liberal model of unitary general repre-
sentation, as they question the notion of both abstract citizens and 
abstract representatives, i.e., the basis on which individuals are con-
sidered equally well represented by any elected body of 
representatives, regardless of the personal features of the representa-
tives. In particular, gender quotas and/or parity bring out that 
elected bodies constituted mostly by male representatives can no 
longer be legitimate because they help perpetuate the separate 
spheres tradition reinforcing its instrumental role in socially defining 
the sexes and the subordination of women. 
B. Women on Corporate Boards 
Many European countries, such as Finland, Sweden, Poland, the 
Netherlands and Denmark, are approaching the problem of women's 
underrepresentation on corporate boards of publicly held companies 
through soft measures including corporate governance codes and 
charters that companies can sign voluntarily. Increasingly, however, 
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gender quotas set by legislation are being considered. In 2003, Nor-
way became the first country in the world to pass a law requiring all 
publically held companies to achieve gender balance (i.e., at least 
40% of each sex) on corporate boards,35 a measure it extended in 2006 
to publicly limited companies. In Spain in 2007, a law introducing 
gender parity for electoral office also enshrined the goal of gender 
parity on corporate boards as a goal to be achieved by 2015. In Ice-
land, legislation adopted in 2010 applicable to publicly owned and 
publicly limited companies with more than fifty employees aims to 
ensure that each sex will make up at least 40% of boards by 2013. 
Even more recently, in 2011 similar quota legislation for state and 
publicly held companies has also been approved in France, Belgium 
and Italy.36 
In the European discourse one finds the business case for diver-
sity defending gender quotas by making reference to the optimization 
of talents as well as the exploitation of distinctive feminine qualities 
that would entail the reduction of risk taking, the increase of respon-
sibility, and a less ego driven managerial style. What is distinctively 
European is that the argument that diversity is good for business is 
often conflated with the argument that it is also good for democ-
racy.37 In my view, this reflects the conceptualization of gender 
quotas on corporate boards as instruments of parity democracy, or, 
stated differently, the intention to disestablish sites of economic and 
social (public) power traditionally inhabited by men only. 
The constitutional debates that corporate board quotas caused in 
France illustrate this. In 2011, a new law was passed, requiring the 
balanced representation of women and men on corporate boards of 
directors of all public companies and giving businesses six years to 
ensure that 40% of boardroom positions are taken by women.38 Prior 
to this, in 2006, a law requiring corporate gender quotas39 had been 
struck down by the Conseil Constitutional on the grounds that the 
law violated Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man.40 A 
constitutional amendment followed in 2008 requiring the law to pro-
35. Since early 2000, also Denmark, Finland and Iceland set gender quotas for 
state-owned companies. 
36. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 2. 
37. See Julie Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Cor-
porate Boards, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming). 
38. hoi no. 2011-10 du 27 Janvier 2011 relative a la representation iquilibree des 
femmes et des hommes au sein des conseils d'administration et de surveillance et a 
I'igalite" professionnelle (1), JORF du 27 Janvier 2011. Within three years French firms 
must ensure that a figure of 20% is reached. The legislation will apply to companies in 
France that are listed, have more than 500 employees or have revenues over 50 mil-
lion euros. 
39. Projet de loi relative a I'e'galite' entre les femmes et les hommes, Texte no. 545, 
23 fevrier 2006, art. 22. 
40. Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 reads 
(my translation): 
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mote equal access by men and women to professional and social 
responsibility.41 Eventually, this enabled the 2011 law to pass consti-
tutional muster. The wording and location of the amendment (in 
Article 1 of the Constitution, i.e., among the grand principles of the 
French Republic) indicate that these changes amount to more than 
mere deviations from the longstanding principle of formal equality. 
Instead, they imply the constitutionalization of parity democracy as 
the modern form of French democracy under which men and women 
are to share the domains of power and the social responsibility that 
the exercise of power entails. Arguably, one can read the reference to 
social responsibility in the French Constitution as including responsi-
bility for social reproduction (spelled out primarily in the managing 
of care and human interdependency) both on its own ground and as a 
necessary corollary to ensuring women the possibility to participate 
in other domains. This would result from understanding gender quo-
tas as following from a constitutional commitment to parity 
democracy. For our purposes it is important to underline that, on the 
basis of substantive equality, the case for mandatory gender quotas 
in corporate boards is more difficult to justify than that of mandatory 
political quotas, for although most liberal democratic constitutions 
contain a right to vote and run for office, they certainly do not contain 
a right to be involved in the management of corporations.42 
IV. PARITY DEMOCRACY, EQUALITY AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW: 
TOWARDS PARITY CITIZENSHIP 
As we can see from the constitutional litigation just described, to 
the extent that both political and corporate gender quotas entail clas-
sifications on the grounds of sex, they have been perceived as 
deviations from the norm of formal equal treatment. Such deviations 
are most commonly justified on the basis of another conception of 
equality namely, one that furthers a substantive or distributive goal, 
such as those of equality of results or, at minimum, equality of oppor-
The law is the expression of general will. All citizens have the right to con-
tribute to its making, either personally or through their representatives. As 
all citizens are equal before the law, they are likewise all equally eligible for 
any public office, position or employment, according to their abilities and 
with no distinction other than their virtues and talents. 
See Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision no. 2006-533 DC du 16 mars 2006, Loi relative a 
I'egalite salariale entre les femmes et les hommes. 
41. Loi constitutionnelle no 2008/724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des in-
stitutions de la Verne Republique, JORF du 24 juillet 2008. 
42. Also, mandatory corporate gender quotas can be seen as limiting property 
rights and economic freedoms that many constitutions explicitly guarantee. In those 
constitutions where the content of property is constitutionally recognized as limited 
by a social function (e.g., art. 33 Spanish Constitution) this social function limitation 
may be interpreted as giving constitutional coverage to mandatory corporate gender 
quotas. Alternatively, a constitutional amendment might be the better way to en-
shrine the parity model. 
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tunity. In fact, as I have suggested, it is not clear that a commitment 
to substantive equality notions is per se sufficient to capture the es-
sence of parity. Its aim is better conceptualized as one of de-
gendering citizenship by affirming what we could call a parity citizen-
ship model. This, I posit, is because even substantive equality notions 
must rely on some understanding of what are essential forms of 
human fulfillment, including modalities of participation in the collec-
tive. Such forms of participation are embedded in the understanding 
of citizenship that is explicitly or implicitly upheld.43 
Let us explore this in more detail. In most European constitu-
tions as well as in European law, including European human rights 
law, a substantive account of equality between the sexes is becoming 
the paradigm. Increasingly, provisions that require equal treatment 
and prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sex are indeed supple-
mented by provisions or doctrinal interpretations allowing public 
powers to take measures that classify on the basis of sex, when these 
measures are proportional to the aim of redressing structural ine-
qualities by redistributing different forms of advantages.44 Moreover, 
some provisions or interpretations go further and do not just allow, 
but indeed compel, public powers to take measures to achieve such 
results.45 
The coexistence of the equal treatment rule and the substantive 
equality mandates is never quite pacific because prima facie they are 
characterized by radically different logics. Thus, whereas formal 
equality is best characterized as a procedural rule shaped like a 
Kantian categorical imperative ("treat equally or do not differentiate 
or classify on the grounds of sex"), the substantive equality mandate 
follows a consequential logic and asserts a substantive outcome, i.e., 
that of ensuring that there be no disadvantages attached to a per-
son's sex or that the existing ones be removed.46 This tension, which 
is well exemplified by the ECJ's case law on sex-based affirmative 
action, is resolved by a balancing exercise, which in Europe takes the 
form of a proportionality test. But the difficulty of identifying, indi-
vidualizing and apportioning responsibilities for structural and 
diffuse systems of privileges and disadvantages makes the task inevi-
tably complex. 
43. On fundamental rights as being secured in a certain area only when the rele-
vant capabilities to function in that area are also secured, see Martha Nussbaum, 
Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (1997). 
44. See arts. 157.1 and 157.4 of TFEU; art. 3 of the Directive 2006/54/EC on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men 
and women in matters of employment and occupation (Gender Recast Directive) and 
art. 23.2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
45. See, e.g., art. 8 of the TFEU, art. 1 of the French Constitution, and art. 3.2 of 
the German Fundamental Law, specific to sex equality. 
46. See Hugh Collins, Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion, 66 MOD. L. 
REV. 16, 18 (2003). 
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Leaving aside the difficult coexistence of formal and substantive 
equality notions, we find that even a substantive reading of the 
equality mandate is to some extent elusive: even if spelled out as 
mandating the aim of "equal opportunities" or "real or de facto equal-
ity" it does not in itself provide an answer to the question of equal 
opportunity "with respect to what?" Without an answer, the 
emancipatory potential of the equality principle remains inevitably 
vague. Now, sometimes sex equality or non-discrimination clauses in 
treaties and constitutions do explicitly refer to the equal enjoyment of 
rights, and since the same legal instruments contain a list of rights 
this list constitutes an a priori demarcation of the relevant sphere of 
substantive equality.47 More often though, this limited equal rights 
conception is supplemented by free-standing clauses prohibiting sex-
based discrimination without specifying the domain in which it 
should apply.48 
Even when the equality or non-discrimination provisions make 
explicit reference to a domain circumscribed by otherwise constitu-
tionally sanctioned rights and freedoms, constraints and/or 
uncertainties regarding the actual reach of substantive equality pro-
visions remain. First, we may find that there is a gender bias in the 
list of rights and freedoms that have been constitutionally enshrined 
and that some of the domains of human capabilities that may argua-
bly be of utmost relevance for human well being have been left out. 
Think for instance of the total absence or generally precarious fram-
ing of reproductive rights in constitutional or human rights 
documents. Second, we are typically confronted with a certain proce-
dural asymmetry that makes the equal or non-discriminatory 
treatment mandate an enforceable right and the disparate treatment 
to ensure substantive equality only a constitutionally valid preroga-
tive or, at best, a generic mandate addressed to state powers. Third, 
the substantive equality rule does not per se define the sources of ine-
quality that can be legitimately targeted nor, more importantly, does 
it say how far the state can intervene in an attempt to redress ine-
qualities, especially when interventions come at the expense of 
limiting (especially political and economic) liberties that are also con-
stitutionally enshrined. 
Some of these uncertainties surrounding the reach and trans-
formative potential of both the formal and substantive constitutional 
equality doctrines can be exemplified by taking a look at the domi-
nant models of antidiscrimination legislation. It has for instance been 
rightly noticed that there is a clear emphasis in antidiscrimination 
law on employment participation or on the possibility to earn a living 
47. See, for instance, art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
48. Art. 3.3 of the German Fundamental Law provides that "no person shall be 
favored or disfavored because of sex." 
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through the provision of services for others.49 The explanation, ac-
cording to Hugh Collins, lies not only in the distributive effects of 
employment, since the egalitarian goal could also be achieved 
through taxation and welfare. Rather the problem is primarily the 
social exclusion or marginalization that derives from employment 
discrimination in a capitalist and market-based society. In such soci-
eties, lack of employment must be understood as entailing an 
exclusion from non-material goods; this includes the opportunity to 
participate in the mechanisms offered by society through which "peo-
ple may establish meaning for their lives, the connections of 
community and a sense of self-respect" given that in such societies 
"work provides for most people the principal mechanisms for con-
structing meaning, community and status."50 What this means then, 
is that rights also constitute prerogatives for socially recognized 
forms of participation and interaction. 
In spite of the prioritization in current antidiscrimination law of 
employment and provision of services, we could arguably expand the 
list of non-material goods that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms 
enables, to embrace more comprehensive notions of human capabili-
ties including participation in education, politics, cultural activities, 
as well as participation in social reproduction and the care of others. 
Access to these participatory domains requires not only the recogni-
tion of rights as prerogatives, but first and foremost, that there are no 
insurmountable barriers in the social organization of these activities 
so that each person is free to choose between a range of possible goals 
in relation to them.51 
The problem is, of course, that even if direct discrimination is 
eliminated, both formal and informal institutional arrangements 
tend to maintain existing distributive patterns.52 As a result, it is 
often the combination of formal institutional rules and informal so-
cial norms that results in the exclusion of some citizens from some 
domains of participation. In order to address this type of distributive 
patterns, sex antidiscrimination laws in Europe have been broadened 
to encompass the formal institutional rules which in combination 
with informal social norms have a discriminatory effect.53 Yet, they 
have done so while remaining within certain narrow domains of par-
ticipation, such as employment and services, privileging thereby the 
"homo oeconomicus." 
Moreover, while disparate or impact based antidiscrimination 
laws have come to challenge the validity of the institutional rules 
49. Collins, supra note 46, at 29. 
50. Id. 
51. Id at 24, 
52. Id. at 30. 
53. See the concept of indirect discrimination under art. l.b) of the Gender Recast 
Directive. 
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(e.g., employment conditions), they have left untouched and unques-
tioned informal social norms (e.g., those requiring women do most of 
the family work or take most of the part-time employment). There is 
then a paradoxical reliance of the law on indirect discrimination on 
the persistence of patterns of structural disadvantage that it may be 
attempting to redress.54 The risk of course, is that by accommodating 
women's "specific situations" (for instance, by adopting measures 
that allow women to reconcile family and work life), we may end up 
reinforcing gender roles.55 Yet, simply ignoring the obstacles that wo-
men, especially in charge of young children, encounter in the labor 
market does not do much to promote their equality either. 
What this suggests is that in the end, a durable solution may 
only lie in identifying what we could call, using Nancy Fraser's clas-
sic distinction, "transformative" as opposed to "affirmative" remedies. 
In our context, this would mean remedies that have the effect of dis-
establishing rather than entrenching gender roles.56 The core of our 
concerns should be first, that many more women than men are struc-
turally excluded from elements that have traditionally been 
considered both essential components of human welfare and socially 
recognized forms of contribution, such as participation in employ-
ment and politics. And second, that many more women than men end 
up spending a significant part of their lives and energies in activities, 
such as the care and nurturing of others, that are neither necessarily 
conceptualized as central to the fulfillment of human welfare nor rec-
ognized as meaningful forms of social contribution. The egalitarian 
project cannot be one that attempts to correct only the former while 
ignoring the relevance of the latter.57 Instead, the solution requires 
an unconventional reading of the proper relationship and balance be-
tween family and private life on the one hand and work life on the 
other through a reassessment of the meaning of participation in each 
domain for both men and women. 
54. Collins, supra note 46. 
55. For instance, there is a growing concern that the newly formulated aim of 
maximizing job opportunities for women through flexible jobs and working conditions 
and family-friendly policy promoted in the European Union under a work/family life 
conciliation concept will risk giving up the model of full equality of opportunities and 
full integration in the primary labor market, and translate into the clustering of wo-
men in a secondary flexible (homework/telework) and part-time labor market. See 
Stratigaki, supra note 17. 
56. See Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in 
a "Postsocialist" Age, in JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS, supra note 6, at 23-26. 
57. This broader transformative goal is what Williams proposes in her recent 
work which she calls reconstructive as opposed to assimilationist feminism, criticizing 
the insufficiencies of a project which sees equality as equality to fit into society as 
currently structured. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: 
WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER (2010). 
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Here we are confronted with a familiar "bootstrapping problem of 
institutional design and innovation."58 A new regime must be estab-
lished by the means and within the constraints of the old. Therefore, 
problem-solving through legislation and institutional innovation be-
comes possible only after a major part of the problem has been solved. 
In other words, the "degendering of politics" or, more broadly speak-
ing of citizenship, must be performed by the means available within 
the institutions and routines of gendered politics.59 This is exactly 
what parity democracy measures would have to redress seeking to 
guarantee equal citizenship, understood as parity citizenship, by dis-
entangling the spheres of participation from gender normativity; 
dismantling the hierarchy between the sexes; and expanding the do-
mains of citizenship to include all the relevant spheres of social 
contribution and human fulfillment including that of social reproduc-
tion. A traditional model of substantive equality that professes equal 
opportunities but replicates the separate and hierarchically ordered 
spheres with its biased conception of human well being and its biased 
assessment of forms of social contribution, cannot achieve this goal. 
All of this invites reflections about the relationship between an-
tidiscrimination law and parity democracy measures. This 
relationship is best spelled out if both are seen as instruments of 
equality law, i.e., as a field of law placed at the service of producing 
and reproducing the basic conditions of legitimacy in any given de-
mocracy. The ultimate aspiration of equality law should be to ensure 
equal citizenship. This would require the law to respond to the speci-
ficities of the different violations of the ideal of equal citizenship 
shaping the exclusion of different groups over history. In this view of 
citizenship the emphasis would not only be placed on rights holding 
but also on the possibility of participation and functioning and on the 
acknowledgement of the value of different forms of participation as a 
source of meaning and status, and hence human welfare. Under this 
understanding of equality law, the specific connection between parity 
democracy and sex antidiscrimination law would be that parity de-
mocracy and the conception of citizenship that it advances would 
provide an answer to the question of the content of substantive equal-
ity applied to sex equality law and to be served by sex 
antidiscrimination law. 
For antidiscrimination doctrine in general and sex antidis-
crimination law in particular, this would have several implications. 
For one thing, sex antidiscrimination law should expand to reflect the 
set of rights and domains of participation that have in the past been 
restricted or limited on the basis of sex. An antidiscrimination doc-
58. See Claus Offe, The Politics of Parity: Can Legal Intervention Neutralize the 
Gender Divide, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN, supra note 15, at 40-41. 
59. Id. 
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trine focusing only on employment would no longer be enough. 
Women's traditional exclusion from the domain of politics and men's 
traditional exclusion from the domain of care should be equally tack-
led. Yet, the ever expanding force of antidiscrimination law should 
not attempt to replace other channels of expression of equality law, 
such as parity equality and socio-economic redistributive measures, 
especially given antidiscrimination law's defensive nature and its 
ability to detect but not redress structural inequities and hence pro-
pose transformative remedies. This would mean that antidiscrimi-
nation litigation would probably be seen as performing a systemic 
function going beyond the resolution of individual claims of justice 
and acting as a trigger for structural reforms that may be better ad-
dressed by the legislator. Similarly, a symmetrical approach to 
antidiscrimination law would probably be inadequate. Instead, ide-
ally, the domains in which antidiscrimination law applies, but also 
the groups that it protects and how such protection operates, would 
better serve the ideal of equal citizenship if antidiscrimination legis-
lation was particularly attuned to the historical circumstances 
dictating the ways in which different groups have in the past encoun-
tered obstacles to their enjoyment of equal citizenship. 
V. EXPORTING PARITY CITIZENSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES: AN 
UNLIKELY VENTURE? 
Gender inequalities in the United States are the same as, or 
worse than, in Europe. To be sure, in its external action the United 
States has joined the UN and other countries in equating women's 
political participation with a strong democracy.60 But then why has 
parity democracy not become a popular enterprise in the United 
States even among those most strongly committed to women's equal-
ity? More importantly, why is the underrepresentation of women in 
such domains not even perceived as a democratic deficit? In the re-
maining pages I am not going to discuss the more or less technical 
details that would make gender quotas to ensure a balanced repre-
sentation of both sexes in all domains of public and private power 
difficult to implement, were they ever to be proposed.61 Instead, I will 
tentatively explore the set of social, legal, historical and cultural fac-
60. See Nancy Millar, Envisioning a US Government that Isn't 84% Male: What 
the United States Can Learn from Sweden, Rwanda, Burundi and Other Nations, 62 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 129, 132 (2007-2008) and Darren Rosenblum, Parity /Disparity: 
Electoral Gender Inequality on the Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2005-2006). 
61. For instance, regarding electoral quotas, it seems clear that certain character-
istics of the American electoral system would make the use of gender quotas more 
difficult including a majority based as opposed to a proportional representation sys-
tem; the uninominal nature of electoral districts; and a decentralized and weaker 
party system that makes individual candidates, much more than political parties, 
true protagonists of the electoral race. 
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tors that in my view make the project of parity citizenship unlikely to 
be seriously considered in the United States to start with. These fac-
tors can perhaps be best fleshed out by anticipating the most common 
reactions that the idea of mandatory political or corporate gender 
quotas would raise. 
A. Sexual Contract versus Racial Contract 
One of the most striking differences between Europe and the 
United States seems to lie in the impossibility to discuss quotas for 
women in the United States without simultaneously addressing the 
political underrepresentation or disempowerment of blacks and other 
minorities. The European parity democracy model seems to rest on 
the assumption that the sexual contract is foundational to the mod-
ern state and needs to be disestablished, and that this distinguishes 
the political exclusion of women from that of other groups whose po-
litical exclusion is, so to say, not as foundational. 
This of course is more difficult to defend in a country where slav-
ery and the inferior political status of blacks for representation 
purposes was, if not explicitly written into the Constitution, then at 
least acknowledged in its Apportionment Clause and the Fugitive 
Slave Clause of the Constitution. This had to be overcome by the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which directly 
shaped the Voting Rights Act and triggered redistricting with atten-
tion to the representation of racial minorities. Whereas women too, 
were excluded, their lack of representation was always an unspoken 
assumption rather than an explicit textual constitutional provision. 
Only when their explicit inclusion through the passage of the Nine-
teenth Amendment took place many years later, did the previous 
exclusion leave a documentary trail.62 
Precisely because women's political exclusion was simply as-
sumed, and did not even require an explicit sanctioning, one may 
argue that it has a distinct and even more pervasive history.63 Look-
ing at the sexual contract only through the lenses of the racial 
contract may thus obscure the specificities as well as commonalities 
62. In contrast, racial discrimination has left less of a constitutional trace in Eu-
rope where most constitutions mention race only as one of the grounds of prohibited 
discrimination along with others and where Europe's paradigmatic forms of racism, 
colonialism and anti-Semitism were territorially externalized and/or seen as part of 
the past. 
63. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: the Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2002) (explaining how Americans 
who adopted the Reconstruction Amendments believed it was unnecessaiy to en-
franchise women under the federal Constitution because women were represented in 
the state through male heads of household and that enfranchising women would 
harm the marriage relationship, and how the Nineteenth Amendment granting fe-
male suffrage challenged the family as a site of male governance in favor of women's 
full citizenship). 
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of both and make it difficult to come up with an adequate interpreta-
tion of sex equality doctrine that places the emphasis on women's 
specific obstacles to equal citizenship linked to the prevalence of the 
separate spheres tradition.64 Yet such specificities regarding access 
to equal citizenship may have a bearing on the types of remedies that 
are designed for each.65 Rather marginal voices have thus far de-
fended the adoption of a Voting Rights Act for Women to institute 
quotas and other support mechanisms.66 For the most part, the sex 
equality and political representation debates have not mixed in the 
United States.67 Doctrinally, a synthetic interpretation of the Four-
teenth and Nineteenth Amendments, like the one advocated by Reva 
Siegel, would allow to bring to the fore that the main purpose of sex 
equality doctrine must be to overcome the relegation of women to the 
family at the expense of the recognition of the full citizenship stat-
ure.68 This interpretation could ground the power of Congress to 
enforce measures to overcome women's political underrepresentation 
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Realistically, however, it seems unlikely that one could press for 
a gender parity democracy model in the United States without inte-
grating some conception of racial parity democracy. This makes the 
project more daunting and less viable both theoretically and politi-
cally because the forces of racism and patriarchy would presumably 
join in opposing it. 
B. Women versus the Family 
Another fascinating point of contrast that may explain why the 
parity democracy model would find more resistance in the United 
States than it does in Europe is the way conservative forces in the 
United States, often mobilized by Christian religious fundamental-
ism, have historically succeeded in presenting every instance of 
affirmation of women's rights and fight for equality as a threat to the 
family. This applies to women's campaign for suffrage; for the Equal 
Rights Amendment; for reproductive rights; and for the ratification of 
64. Id. at 12. 
65. Rosenblum, supra note 60, at 1132. 
66. See Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Femi-
nism, 1999 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 21, 59 (1999). But see Rosenblum, supra note 60, at 1170, 
arguing in favor of more fluid remedies to avoid the essentializing consequences of 
quotas. Similarly, Jane Mansbridge, The Descriptive Political Representation of Gen-
der: An Anti-Essentialist Argument, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN, supra note 
15, at 19-39. 
67. Thus the two principal sources for sex discrimination law, the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 do not address electoral exclusion. Rem-
edies for political underrepresentation have centered on the dramatic exclusion of 
blacks from voting until the Civil Rights Movement succeeded in forcing passage of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See Rosenblum, supra note 60, at 1127-29. 
68. Siegel, supra note 63. 
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CEDAW.69 It is therefore most likely that the parity democracy model 
would first be constructed as a fundamental threat to the family, and, 
to the extent that it stems from a nation-wide project, also to federal-
ism notions locating the family within the sphere of state jurisdiction; 
it would then be resisted on the exact same grounds as all other wo-
men's rights initiatives. In other words, it would probably be 
perceived as social engineering forcing women out of and men into 
the house, thereby challenging a presumed natural order of things. 
Constitutionally, both gender neutral readings of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and privacy notions derived from the Fourteenth 
Amendment would probably be alleged to claim non-interference with 
the family. 
The irony is of course that the parity equality model purports to 
enhance the political and social recognition of the activities that so 
far mostly women perform in the so called private (family) domain. 
This is why resistance articulated precisely in the name of family val-
ues shows that what is truly at stake is the defense of an alleged 
natural order of things (i.e., preserving the sexual contract) and not 
the defense of care, human reproduction and interdependency.70 
In Europe, the parity measures have been defended as good for 
all (politics and corporations will be better off if the resources of both 
sexes are included, and society will be better off if both men and wo-
men can better reconcile family and work) or as a matter of justice to 
women whose equal rights and participation must define what de-
mocracy is fundamentally about. Thus, to the extent that the family 
has come into the discussion it is to claim the need for men's larger 
involvement in it or the likeliness that women's empowerment will 
translate into more family friendly policies. 
C. Individualism, Autonomy, Meritocracy and the Unencumbered 
Market Forces 
Underlying the U.S. rejection of strict and mandatory gender 
quotas is of course the critical understanding that quotas on the basis 
of sex violate formal equality and a gender neutral reading of the 
Equal Protection Clause. This reflects an anticlassification reading of 
such provision that has gained strength over the competing an-
69. Siegel, supra note 63; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitu-
tionalism and Backlash, 42 HAEV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007); for an example of 
conservative arguments against a U.S. ratification of CEDAW, see the paper spon-
sored by The Heritage Foundation: Grace Smith Melton, CEDAW: How U.N. 
Interference Threatens Rights of American Women, BACKGROUNDER, no. 2227 (Jan. 9, 
2009). 
70. In this the analogy again with conservative forces proclaiming family values 
to defend pro-life positions but failing to give mothers (including single mothers) the 
public assistance they need is striking. 
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tisubordination interpretation.71 To be sure, as discussed, strict 
quotas are not uncontroversial in Europe either because despite the 
prevalent substantive equality model and the application of indirect 
discrimination as a constitutional doctrine, the formal equality prin-
ciple still exists forcing a proportionality analysis. Such analysis is 
more likely to succeed with regard to measures that are less invasive 
than strict quotas and closer to the ideal of ensuring equal opportuni-
ties but not equal results. As we saw, both France, with a formal 
equality constitutional tradition, and Italy, espousing a substantive 
equality logic, in the end required constitutional amendments before 
mandatory political quotas as well as corporate quotas could be 
enacted.72 
The greater resistance towards the enactment of legislative mea-
sures to ensure women's access to positions of power in both the 
political and the economic domains is also related to the stronger U.S. 
individualist tradition and its faith in both autonomy and mer-
itocracy as expressed through the free functioning of the market and 
of social forces, including capital and political parties, that constitu-
tional provisions such as First Amendment associational rights of 
political parties help to protect.73 In Europe, the social or welfare 
state tradition with its post-World War II constitutional embedding 
has less difficulty advancing the notion that political and economic 
imbalances of powers may require positive corrections by the State to 
protect the more vulnerable. Also in harmony with this social state 
tradition is the conceptualization of positions of power in political of-
fice and corporate governance not only as highly paid and recognized 
positions for which individuals must freely compete, but also as posi-
tions of social responsibility that might justify interference of 
otherwise constitutionally protected spheres of autonomy (such as 
freedom of enterprise or the autonomy of political parties) for the 
sake of ensuring a more egalitarian system and a more perfect de-
mocracy.74 If the social state has traditionally allowed such 
71. For the antisubordination approach, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108, 157 (1976) and LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1514-21 (2d ed. 1988). Describing both traditions, 
see Jack Balkin & Reva Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassifica-
tion or Antisubordination'?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003). 
72. This of course raises a separate question, which is the easiness or difficulty of 
constitutional amendments. In view of past experience showing the rarity of constitu-
tional amendments in the United States, especially compared to European countries, 
it seems that a constitutional reform to enshrine parity democracy in the United 
States would most probably fail. 
73. Several American scholars have argued that political parties' First Amend-
ment rights would constitute the largest constitutional obstacles to gender electoral 
quotas. Rosenblum, supra note 60, at 1170 n.251 (citing relevant legal precedent) and 
Lisa Schnall, Comment, Party Parity: A Defense of the Democratic Party Equal Divi-
sion Rule, 13 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y AND L. 381, 391-92 (2005); Millar, supra 
note 60, at 154-55. 
74. Suk, supra note 37. 
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interventions to address redistributive imbalances related to class hi-
erarchies, then arguably a parity democracy model can do the same 
to disestablish sexual hierarchies. 
D. Anti-essentialism and Anti-stereotyping 
One of the most interesting contrasts between Europe and the 
United States is the degree of controversy that gender quotas would 
stir up in the United States even among those who are otherwise con-
sidered the most committed to women's equality.75 Although some 
feminists in Europe have also questioned quotas, raising the concern 
about tokenism and paternalism, what seems to be most distinctively 
American is the deep concern with essentialism. In Europe, quotas 
have been defended both by those who believe that women can add a 
distinctive way of ruling (more collaborative, less competitive or ego 
driven) and those who sustain that this is ultimately irrelevant be-
cause the point is simply treating women as equal citizens. In 
contrast, in the United States, quotas would most likely be seen as 
rigid and essentializing, and the affirmation of the difference that wo-
men can make is likely to be controversial enough to prevent 
feminists of different strands from joining forces to support the 
initiative. 
The reasons that account for this utmost concern with essential-
izing women are probably several. For one thing, the U.S. sex 
antidiscrimination doctrine has been mostly concerned with fighting 
gender stereotypes in general, and those that confine the women to 
the home, perpetuate the breadwinner role, and limit women's ability 
to act as full citizens in particular.76 This has prevented this doctrine 
from allowing the law to accommodate women's differences, even if 
they can be statistically proven (like women doing more housework 
than men) and even if they can be interpreted not as inherent differ-
ences (i.e., expressive of women's essential and distinctive nature) 
but rather as differences that result from masculine norms such as 
75. On the impasse of American feminism generated by the egalitarian and differ-
ence strands of feminism, see Nancy Fraser, Multiculturalism, Antiessentialism, and 
Radical Democracy: A Genealogy of the Current Impasse in Feminist Theory, in JUS-
TICE INTERRUPTUS, supra note 6, at 175-77. 
76. On the anti-stereotyping paradigm of U.S. antidiscrimination law, see Reva B. 
Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Car-
hart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1774 (2008); Mary Anne Case, The Very Stereotype the Law 
Condemns: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1472 (2000); MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, 
THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTY CENTURY TRAGEDIES 37 (1995) and RE-
SHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE, supra note 57, at 75. In contrast, the European 
sex antidiscrimination model has thus far prioritized addressing women's real obsta-
cles by accommodating their sex-specificity, both social and biological, at the risk of 
perpetuating effects in terms of gender roles that this option may entail. See Julie 
Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women ? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and 
Work-Family Conflict, 110 COL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2010). 
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those enshrining the separate spheres ideology.77 Given that reac-
tionary movements resisting women's rights have relied precisely on 
the defense of the family, it is not surprising that there has been re-
sistance towards defending women's rights and equality on the 
grounds of "family-related" specificities of women, whether natural or 
constructed. Also, in a state that can only be minimally relied upon to 
limit the powers of employers, granting women-specific rights that 
reflect their roles in care and reproduction is inevitably a double-edge 
sword. 
VI. FINAL THOUGHTS 
In the end, we find the very assertion that women and women's 
presence can make a difference—an assertion without which quotas 
to ensure the balanced participation of women in positions of power 
can hardly be defended—to be much more controversial in the United 
States than in Europe. This is the case because it is inevitably taken 
as a claim about women's essential differences rather than about the 
enduring effects of the separate spheres ideology which the proclama-
tion of formal equality has not been able to unsettle. And what the 
need for women's presence has come to reflect, at least in Europe, is 
the very fact that in more and more European societies a male-only 
government or male-only corporate world is increasingly perceived as 
a democratic deficit. While we are still a far cry from actually over-
coming that deficit both in Europe and in the United States, this 
paper intends to suggest that, in some respects, Europe has moved in 
the right direction. Viewed from a European perspective, the path to-
wards a parity democracy sex equality model in the United States 
seems to be filled with ideological and constitutional hurdles that 
seem much harder, albeit probably not impossible, to take. 
Yet parity citizenship cannot stop at gender quotas to empower 
women. Instead it requires quite a bit of social engineering and public 
spending if the care of others that women have thus far been provid-
ing "for free, in the private," is to gain in visibility, social 
respectability, and, at least in aspiration, equally shared by men. 
None of this seems likely unless economic production, consumption 
and the market are at least partly deprived from the unchallenged 
aura they have enjoyed in advanced market capitalist societies over 
the last decades. It remains to be seen whether a large-scale eco-
nomic recession is what is needed to start embracing a more 
comprehensive vision of the human being and human welfare, chal-
lenging the hegemonic role of the "homo oeconomicus" as the 
77. See WILLIAMS, supra note 57, at 114. 
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paradigmatic citizen. Nothing less than challenging that role is 
needed for parity citizenship to become the new universal standard of 
citizenship. 
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